In 2006, Lu et al. proposed a proxy signature with revocation based on the discrete logarithm problem. In their scheme an original signer delegated his signing capability to a proxy signer on behalf of the original signer and revoke delegation when forgery detected. All previous proxy signature schemes have been based on single problem. Therefore, it has been proven it will not secure anymore since day to day single problem has been solved. To encounter this problem we propose a new proxy signature with revocation with two hard problems. To our best knowledge, this is the first proxy signature with revocation based on factoring and discrete logarithms using two hard problems with advancement security.
Introduction
The first proxy signature was introduced by Mambo et al. [1, 2] in 1996. There are two participators involved in this schemes which are original signer and proxy signer. The original signer is able to authorize the proxy signer as his proxy agent in the proxy signature schemes. In proxy signature schemes, Mambo et al. [1] specified the seven properties required in a proxy signature, which are unforgeability, undeniability, identifiability, secret-keys dependence, verifiability, distinguishability and proxy signer's deviation. There are three types of delegation which are based on full delegation, partial delegation and delegation by warrant. In the full delegation, the original signer will use the same private key as to the proxy signer. However, by using this approach, forgery will happen because proxy uses the same private key and this approach is no longer secure. In the partial delegation scheme, when the original signer wants to delegate his signing capability, the proxy signer will be given a proxy key from the original signer. Proxy signer will then use the proxy key to sign a message on behalf of the original signer. In the delegation by warrant scheme, to generate proxy signatures, a proxy warrant is given to the proxy signer. The warrant contains the valid period of delegation, the identity of the proxy signer, and other rules of capability to sign a message.
Mambo et al. [1] introduced the signature schemes based on discrete logarithm problem. Earlier in 2003, Shao [6] introduced a proxy signature based on factoring problem. Through the paper, the RSA [8] a scheme developed using factoring problem, was prove can be used when applied in the proxy signature. Next, Han et al. [5] in 2005 introduced a relatively new proxy signature scheme which is as secure as ElGamal signature [4] . They demonstrated that the new scheme has the capability of preventing the original signer from impersonating the proxy signer to sign a message. They also proved that this scheme has fair identifiability, verifiability and undeniability. In this scheme, the fair privacy of the proxy signer is preserved since the message is signed by the proxy signer on behalf of the original signer. Since then many different types of proxy schemes are proposed [7, [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] .
A new proxy signature with revocation was introduced by Lu et al. [3] in 2005. In this scheme, when there exists a forgery, the original signer can revoke the delegations. This scheme is based on single hard problem which is discrete logarithms problem. However, any scheme that uses a single hard problem will eventually be solved by adversaries. For more security, a signature based on two hard problems was introduced by L. Harn and L. Li et al. [9, 10] : factoring and discrete logarithms. To improve security, we proposed a new proxy signature with revocation based on factoring and discrete logarithms. This is due to the fact that solving two hard problems simultaneously is impossible. In this section, we briefly review definitions and requirements of proxy signatures with revocation and refer to reader to [2] for more complete account. The participants in their scheme include an original signer, proxy signer and authentication server (ATS). The scheme contains 9 phase: Proxy generation, proxy delivery, verification and alteration of the proxy, proxy validation, time-stamp generation, time-stamp delivery, time-stamp verification, signature generation and verification of the proxy signature. This section first introduces the scheme's parameter setting and then describes the details of every phase. 
Basic notation
a. h(.) cryptographic function which output is a t-bit length. b. ݉ ௪ the warrant containing the identity of the proxy signer and the original signer and the valid period of delegation. c. p is a large prime and ݊ is a factor of ሺ ‫‬ െ 1ሻ that is the product of two safe primes ܽ and ܾ which is ܽ ൌ ‫2‬ ᇱ 1 and ܾ ൌ ‫ݍ2‬ ᇱ 1, where ‫‬ ᇱ and ‫ݍ‬ ᇱ are primes, i.e., ݊ ൌ ܽ ܾ . d. ߶ሺ݊ ሻ ൌ ሺܽ െ 1ሻሺܾ െ 1ሻ is a Euler-Phi function. e. ݃ is an element in ሼ0, 1, 2, … , ሺ‫‬ െ 1ሻ} with order ݊ satisfying ݃ ൌ 1 mod ‫‬ . f. gcdሺߙ, ߚሻ is the greatest common divisor of ߙ and ߚ.
The Lu et al's scheme is only based on single hard problem which is discrete logarithm problem. This scheme is based on factoring and discrete logarithm problem. There are three participants involved: an original signer, a proxy signer and an authentication server (ATS).
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The New Proxy Signature Scheme
Key Generation for Original Signer
Firstly, the original signer computes ݀ ை ൌ ݁ ை ିଵ mod ߶ሺ݊ ଵ ሻ with gcdሺ݁ ை , ߶ሺ݊ ଵ ሻሻ ൌ 1 and ‫ݕ‬ ଵ ൌ ݃ ଵ ௫ భ mod ‫.‬ Thus, the private key for original signer is (݀ , ‫ݔ‬ ଵ ሻ and public key for original signer is (݁ ை , ‫ݕ‬ ଵ ).
Key Generation for Proxy Signer
Secondly, the proxy signer computes ‫ݕ‬ ଶ ൌ ݃ ଵ ௫ మ mod ‫.‬ Proxy signer shares a key ݀ with original signer, so the private key for proxy signer is ሺ݀ , ‫ݔ‬ ଶ ሻ and public key for proxy signer is (݁ ை , ‫ݕ‬ ଶ ).
Key Generation for Authentication Server (ATS)
Thirdly, the Authentication Server (ATS) calculates ݀ ൌ ݁ ିଵ mod ߶ሺ݊ ଷ ሻ with gcdሺ݁ , ߶ሺ݊ ଷ ሻሻ ൌ 1 and ‫ݕ‬ ଷ ൌ ݃ ଷ ௫ య mod ‫.‬ Thus, the private key for AS is (݀ , ‫ݔ‬ ଷ ሻ and public key for ATS is (݁ , ‫ݕ‬ ଷ ).
The detail of the proposed proxy signature scheme is described as follows: b. Proxy signer will request a time stamp from ATS to sign a message m and transmits his identity ‫ݑ(‬ ଵ , ݉ሻ securely to the ATS. Before the time stamp is given, ATS will use a tuple (݉ ௪ , ‫ݎ‬ , ‫ݑ‬ ଵ ሻ to check whether it is still in valid period specified in ݉ ௪ and ‫ݎ‬ is not in revocation list. 
Proxy Generation

Time Stamp Generation
Verification of the Proxy Signer
Any verifier must first use the same verification procedure of the original signer to check ܵ݅݃݊ ఙ ,ఙ ሺ݉ሻ. To verify the signature, verifier has to check whether these two following equations hold.
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Revocation protocol
When the original signer delegates his signing power to a proxy signer in the proxy warrant, ݉ ௪ is included in a valid delegation period and other constrains on signing capability. Delegation period is the time allocation that must be done and will be terminated after the valid period expires. However, if the original signer wants to cancel the transactions before the time expires, the original signer then asks the ATS to put ‫ݎ‬ in a public revocation list.
The ATS will check both valid delegation periods specified in the proxy warrant ݉ ௪ and the ‫ݎ‬ in the public revocation list in time stamp generation. If no matching ‫ݎ‬ revocation list and still in valid delegation period, the ATS will issue a time-stamp for a message. If the delegation period still valid but r can be found, the ATS will refuse the proxy signer's request and also if the delegation period has expired, the ATS will refuse the proxy signer's request. Once the delegation period has expired note that the ‫ݎ‬ in the revocation list can be removed. Thus, the size of the revocation list will become limited.
Analysis
Verifier confirms the validity of the signature by testing the verification equation is holds or not.
Theorem. If the algorithms for generating keys and signing messages run smoothly then the validation of signature is correct.
Proof. The equation in verifying algorithms is true for valid signature since,
Next section discusses the security properties that satisfy the needs of proxy signature with revocation and we show how the two hard problems will make our system more secure based on these properties.
Strong Unforgeability
In the proposed schemes, there is no one who can forge a valid proxy signature. It is because we need an alternative private key of proxy signer ߪ ൌ ߪ ‫ݔ‬ ଶ ݄ሺ݉ ௪ , ‫ݎ‬ ሻ mod ‫‬ െ 1. To compute this private key we need ‫ݔ‬ ଶ which is a private key of proxy. In this case even original signer also cannot compute ߪ and ߪ because adversary also does not know the private key of proxy signer. So there is no one who can forge a proxy signature.
Assuming that if DLP is solvable, adversary still does not know the ߪ which have the secret key of proxy signer. Assuming that if factoring is solvable and adversary knows the secret key ݀ ை , adversary just knows the ߪ and still cannot compute ߪ because adversary still does not know the private key of proxy signer ‫ݔ‬ ଶ .
Verifiability
In this proposed scheme, proxy signature includes a warrant ݉ ௪ and ‫ݎ‬ generated by original signer. So, any verifier can be convinced of the agreement of the original signer on the signed message from the warrant ݉ ௪ and ‫ݎ‬ .
Proxy Signer Deviation
A proxy signer cannot create a valid signature for other proxy signature. It is because the generation of proxy signatures needs a proxy's private key and all valid signatures created by a proxy can only be detected as his signatures. As we know that, all proxy private keys are kept secret by their own.
Distinguishability
Valid proxy signature is created by proxy signer and a valid ordinary signature is created by original signer. There are differences between proxy signature and ordinary signature because the verifying of this signature utilizes by different congruence.
Strong Identifiability
Original signer will send a warrant ݉ ௪ which contains an identity of proxy signer. Therefore anyone can identify the identity of proxy signer from the proxy signatures created by him.
Secret-Key Dependence
In this proposed scheme the proxy signature is generated from original signer private key. It shows that ߪ and ‫ݑ‬ ଵ is computed from original secret key ‫ݔ‬ ଵ and ݀ ை and this condition is satisfactory.
Strong Undeniability
Since the proxy signature ሺ݉, ݉ ௪ , ‫ݎ‬ , ܵ݅݃݊ ఙ ,ఙ ሺ݉ሻ, ‫ݎ‬ ௦ , ‫,ݐ‬ ‫ݑ‬ ଷ ሻ is included with secret key of proxy singer ‫ݔ‬ ଶ and ݀ in ߪ ൌ ߪ ‫ݔ‬ ଶ ݄ሺ݉ ௪ , ‫ݎ‬ ሻ mod ‫‬ െ 1 and ߪ ൌ ݀ , the proxy signer cannot deny the proxy signature he created.
Next, we show that our scheme is heuristically secured by considering the following five most common attacks. Attack 3: It is assumed Adv wants to impersonate the proxy signer and able to solve a DL problem. In this case adversary knows ‫ݔ‬ ଶ and can generate ߪ ൌ ߪ ‫ݔ‬ ଶ ݄ሺ݉ ௪ , ‫ݎ‬ ሻ mod ‫‬ െ 1 in time stamp generation. Unfortunately, he does not know ݀ ை hence does not have ߪ and fails to produce proxy signature. Next, we assume adversary knows the prime factorization of ݊ ଵ also ܽ ଵ and ܾ ଵ and can find number of ݀ ை however he cannot compute ߪ ൌ ߪ ‫ݔ‬ ଶ ݄ሺ݉ ௪ , ‫ݎ‬ ሻ mod ‫‬ െ 1 since no information is available for ‫ݔ‬ ଶ . Thus, he still fails to produce proxy signature.
Attack 4: It is assumed adversary wants to impersonate as an ATS and able to solve a DL problem. In this case adversary knows the value of ‫ݔ‬ ଷ and can generate ܶ ௦ ൌ ݇ ௦ ‫ݎܭ‬ ‫ݔ‬ ଷ ݄ሺ݉, ‫,ݐ‬ ‫ݎ‬ ௦ ሻmod ‫‬ െ 1 in time stamp generation. Unfortunately, he does not know ݀ hence cannot compute ‫ݑ‬ ଷ ൌ ܶ ௦ ௗ ಲ mod ݊ ଷ and fails to produce time stamps to send to proxy signer. We assume adversary knows the prime factorization of ݊ ଷ also ܽ ଷ and ܾ ଷ and can find number of ݀ however he cannot compute ܶ ௦ ൌ ݇ ௦ ‫ݎܭ‬ ‫ݔ‬ ଷ ݄ሺ݉, ‫,ݐ‬ ‫ݎ‬ ௦ ሻmod ‫‬ െ 1 since no information is available for ‫ݔ‬ ଷ . Thus, he still fails to produce time stamps generation.
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In this paper, we proposed a new proxy signature with revocation schemes based on factoring and discrete logarithms. The scheme based on two hard problems provides longer and higher level of security than single hard problem. Besides, attacks and security are also discussed to show how secure this scheme is compared to single hard problem.
